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Objective: To introduce and evaluate a method that uses electronic medical record (EMR) data to measure
the effects of computer system downtime on clinical processes associated with pathology testing and
results reporting.
Materials and methods: A matched case-control design was used to examine the effects of five downtime
events over 11-months, ranging from 5 to 300 min. Four indicator tests representing different laboratory
workflows were selected to measure delays and errors: potassium, haemoglobon, troponin and activated
partial thromboplastin time. Tests exposed to a downtime were matched to tests during unaffected con-
trol periods by test type, time of day and day of week. Measures included clinician read time (CRT), lab-
oratory turnaround time (LTAT), and rates of missed reads, futile searches, duplicate orders, and missing
test results.
Results: The effects of downtime varied with the type of IT problem. When clinicians could not logon to a
results reporting system for 17-min, the CRT for potassium and haemoglobon tests was five (10.3 vs.
2.0 days) and six times (13.4 vs. 2.1 days) longer than control (p = 0.01–0.04; p = 0.0001–0.003).
Clinician follow-up of tests was also delayed by another downtime involving a power outage with a small
effect. In contrast, laboratory processing of troponin tests was unaffected by network services and routing
problems. Errors including missed reads, futile searches, duplicate orders and missing test results could
not be examined because the sample size of affected tests was not sufficient for statistical testing.
Conclusion: This study demonstrates the feasibility of using routinely collected EMR data with a matched
case-control design to measure the effects of downtime on clinical processes. Even brief system down-
times may impact patient care. The methodology has potential to be applied to other clinical processes
with established workflows where tasks are pre-defined such as medications management.
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Information technology (IT) can enhance the safety and qual-
ity of clinical processes, but poorly designed, implemented or
used systems may have unintended consequences, and even con-
tribute to patient harm [1,2]. Technical problems are a major
contributor to IT-related patient safety incidents. For example,in our analysis of incidents reported to the US Food and Drug
Administration 96% of problems related to technical issues [3].
Computer system downtime features amongst such reports, and
appears to be common in hospitals. A downtime is a period of
time when IT is either unavailable or only partially available
because of planned maintenance or an unplanned event [4].
There is no active surveillance of the frequency and scope of
downtimes currently experienced by hospitals. A recent survey
of US hospitals found that downtimes were common, and often
lasted 8 or more hours [5]. In other industries, with more mature
IT systems, organisations typically experience 25 h of downtime
per year [6].
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patient outcomes
There remain major gaps in evidence regarding the effects of
downtime on clinical processes and patient outcomes. While the
use of IT in pathology testing is well examined in the health infor-
matics literature, little is known about disruption of these pro-
cesses due to downtime [7–9]. There are case reports about some
large-scale events, for instance one that affected 80 trusts in Eng-
land’s NHS [10]. Other examples come from the USA e.g. where it
took more than 9 hours to restore services to the 17 sites in the
Veterans Affairs Administration after a similar outage [10]. At
Boston’s Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Centre, it took 4 days to
restore systems [11].
Delays due to downtime: While some downtimes may be
uneventful, our previous analysis of incident reports indicates that
hospitals are particularly susceptible to downtime. Information
critical to treating patients could not, for example, be accessed
for up to 8 h at a time [12]. This lack of access to the electronic
medical record (EMR), order entry and results reporting systems
disrupted multiple clinical processes simultaneously. In one case,
cancer diagnosis was delayed for six patients because specimens
were not analysed as ordered and cytology results were not avail-
able [13].
In one US study involving five hospitals it was reported that
downtime was highly disruptive to workflow [14]. Another survey
of 78 hospitals found monthly downtime for medication systems
lasted up to 8 hours [15]. The only study prospectively measuring
downtime, done in 2003, was restricted to an emergency depart-
ment, and detected 77 events ranging from a few minutes to
16 h over 4 months [16].
Errors and patient harm due to downtime: Although the epidemi-
ology of IT-related adverse events has not been studied, qualitative
studies provide some insight into their nature. Recent surveys of
US hospitals have linked downtime to medication errors, increased
length of stay [15] and patient harm [5]. An observational study
identified 22 new types of IT-related errors which delayed medica-
tion orders [17]. In our analyses of incidents most adverse events
were associated with clinical processes [13,18]. For example, a
hospital-wide system breakdown delayed post-surgery treatment
leading to a permanent musculoskeletal disability. In another case,
a patient died when a network problem delayed transmission of
images for diagnosis.1.2. The need for methods to measure the effects of downtime
Current approaches to examining downtime are primarily
based on reports from clinicians which usually appear well after
issues are resolved and are not directly actionable [3,12]. Many
incidents may go undetected, or be detected only after patients
have been harmed [14,19]. Moreover incident reports cannot be
used to measure delays to clinical processes and quantify the
effects of errors on patients because the reports do not represent
a systematic sample [20].
The lack of methods to measure the effects of downtime ham-
pers preparedness and response [2]. Without robust data it is not
possible to employ surveillance methods for early detection of IT
system failures before they impact care delivery and patient safety
[21,22]. Nor is it possible to guide hospital administrators, policy
makers and IT implementers on appropriate strategies to minimize
disruptions to clinical work, safety practices to avoid patient
misadventure, and the engineering approaches to improve IT sys-
tem resilience [23].1.3. Objective and hypotheses
One way to quantify the effects of downtime in hospitals is to
measure the real-time effects on clinical processes which can be
tracked using EMR data [2]. For example, a new record with an
electronic timestamp is created in the EMR when a pathology test
is ordered, the record is subsequently updated when results are
available and when viewed by a clinician. These markers can be
used to identify the effects of a downtime, which can occur at
any time during processing of the test. EMR data can also be used
to examine errors such as missed follow-up of test results and
duplicate testing [24].
The objective of this study was to assess the feasibility of using
routinely collected EMR data to measure the effects of downtime
on clinical processes. We focus on pathology tests because labora-
tories provide up to 80% of the information used by clinicians to
make important medical decisions and IT use directly influences
patient safety in this process [25,26]. Based on the literature we
hypothesize three scenarios for downtime to disrupt pathology
testing [14–17,27]:
(1) Disruption at the time test orders are received by the labora-
tory may delay processing i.e. increasing laboratory turn
around time (LTAT) [28]. Clinicians may find results are not
available at the expected time (i.e. search for results is futile)
and may generate duplicate orders [29].
(2) Disruption after test orders are received by the laboratory
and until results are posted may mean results go missing
(missing results) or are delayed [30]. Again, futile searches
may lead to duplicate orders.
(3) Disruption after posting of test results may cause tests to be
missed by clinicians (i.e. missed reads) or delay review of
results (i.e. increasing clinician read time, CRT) [7]. For
instance, a results reporting system may not be accessible
for several hours following a downtime.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Pathology tests and results
The study was conducted in a 350-bed metropolitan teaching
hospital in Australia. The hospital’s order entry, results reporting
and EMR were integrated with the laboratory information system.
Pathology tests and results for all admissions were extracted from
the EMR between February 2011 and January 2012, excluding
those associated with deceased patients and critical tests commu-
nicated directly to the ordering clinician. This accounted for
3,408,437 records. For each test order, timestamps were available
when a test was performed by the laboratory, when results were
posted and available, and when they were reviewed by a clinician.
If a clinician attempted to review a result before it was available
then this was also recorded by the system and was counted as a
futile search. The time of initial order entry was not available in
the current system.
Four indicator tests were chosen because they represent the
four major workflows in the laboratory and have been widely used
as indicators of laboratory performance [28,31,32]. They are also
representative of a number of other tests also used for acute care.
There are shared components for each pathway but they each have
their own specific factors.
All four indicator tests have the same initial workflow of recep-
tion, checking tubes and forms, and data entry and tube labelling
with an internal barcode.
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automated analytical line including centrifugation linked
to the analyser. This is the same workflow as over 30 other
analytes (same analyser, same analytical time, results avail-
able at the same time). The tests include the following
groups or individual tests: electrolytes, urea, creatinine,
bicarbonate, liver function tests, iron studies, lipids, creatine
kinase, amylase, lipase, lactate dehydrogenase, uric acid, lac-
tate, six therapeutic drugs, paracetamol, ethanol.
(2) Troponin: This shares the same pre-analytical steps as potas-
sium but is measured on a separate (but joined) analyser
using different technology and with a longer analytical time.
This workflow is the same as for over 20 other tests includ-
ing thyroid function tests, human chorionic gonadotropin,
testosterone, oestradiol, luteinizing hormone, follicle-
stimulating hormone, cortisol, tumour markers, sex hor-
mone binding globulin, vitamin b12 and folate.
(3) Haemoglobin: After bar coding the tube is passed manually to
the hematology laboratory for analysis together with the
other components of the full blood count, including white
cell count, platelets and others.
(4) APTT: After bar coding the tube is passed manually to the
haemostasis laboratory. The instrument measuring APTT
also measures International Normalised Ratio (INR).
2.2. IT incidents
We examined five downtime events that were recorded by the
hospital IT department between February 2011 and January 2012
(Table 1). System downtime ranged from 5 min to 5 h. Two events
occurred between 9 am and 5 pm lasting 5 min and 17 min,Table 1
Five downtime events were examined.
No. Date Start time End time Duration (min) D
1 28/04/2011 03:00 08:00 300 N
2 30/08/2011 14:18 14:35 17 A
3 19/09/2011 06:16 08:00 104 P
4 14/10/2011 10:10 10:15 5 N
5 26/10/2011 03:30 07:30 270 S
Fig. 1. Identifying pathology tests affected by downtime. ‘P’ is the time the test is perfor
clinician reviews the existing results, and ‘S’ and ‘E’ represent the start and end times of a
be available or reviewed during a downtime, based on the 80th percentile value for therespectively. Based on our previous analyses of safety problems
with IT the five events represent the usual types of problems that
lead to downtime [3,18]. Other downtime events with incomplete
data were excluded. The contingency process for significant inter-
ruptions to system availability was to hand deliver urgent test
requests to the laboratory and results were communicated to clin-
icians by telephone. The contingency process for major interrup-
tions to system availability was to hand deliver urgent test
requests to the laboratory and results were communicated to clin-
icians by telephone. This process did not come into effect for any of
the events examined in this study; the one event which inter-
rupted system availability lasted only 17 min.2.3. Study design: Defining downtime and control groups
For each downtime, we performed a matched case-control
study. Each active test order during a downtime was matched to
a test in a control group by test type, time of the day, and day of
the week (Fig. 1, Appendix A). The control group came from a
matched period in the week before and after the event, as these
time periods were most likely to share the same characteristics
of patient load, clinical staffing and IT system infrastructure as
the downtime group. For example, a potassium test associated
with a downtime on Thursday 28 April from 3:00 to 8:00 was
matched to a randomly selected potassium test ordered from
3:00 to 8:00 on the Thursday of the previous week or the following
week (21 April and 5 May). Other periods appeared to be poorer
choices for control groups because clinician work patterns and
pathology testing processes varied by the time of the day, day of
the week and month of the year (Fig. 2) [33,34].escription (IT problem type)
etwork switch problem (network routing)
pplication failure: users could not log on to hospital systems (network service)
ower outage, network switch needed to be re-configured (power outage)
etwork switches blew and needed replacing (network routing)
witch blew at 3:30 and needed replacing, done at 7:30 am (network routing)
med by the laboratory, ‘A’ is the time the result becomes available, ‘R’ is the time a
downtime. The time points with a dotted circle indicate a test that would potentially
LTAT/CRT.
Fig. 2. The volume of tests varied by the time of day and day of the week.
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index event to confirm that any differences seen between down-
time and control groups were not a result of natural variation in
the data set, unrelated to downtime events (Appendix B). The
downtime and control periods did not coincide with any public
holidays and weekends.
To obtain sufficient samples for statistical testing we grouped
tests into 2-h segments. For example, tests between 1:00 AM and
2:59 AM were all allocated to the same subset for matching pur-
poses. Each one-to-one pair match was treated as an individual
stratum, as this provided the most effective design when cases
and controls were equally scarce [35].
For 7% of tests the processing time extended beyond one
week, and thus spanned both downtime and control periods.
These tests were allocated to either a downtime or control
period by estimating the most likely CRT for the test if no
downtime was present, using the 80% centile from all similar tests
(Appendix A).2.4. Outcome measures and statistical analyses
The following measures were extracted from the EMR data set:
Clinician processes
(1) Clinician read time (CRT): The time from when results were
available to when they were first reviewed.
(2) Missed reads: Number of tests for which results were avail-
able but were not reviewed by a clinician.
(3) Futile searches: Number of tests that were accessed by a clin-
ician prior to availability of results.
(4) Duplicate orders: Number of tests performed on a patient
within 12 h of the same test being performed.
Laboratory processes
(5) Laboratory turn around time (LTAT): Time from when a test
was performed until the result was available for reading by a
clinician [28].
(6) Missing test results: Number of tests that were performed but
results were not posted.
We calculated the sample size required to detect a difference
between downtime and control groups with a significance level
of 0.05 and power of 80% (Appendix C) [36]. A repeated cross val-
idation method i.e. resampling randomly and testing 1000 times
was employed, to ensure reliable comparison between groups,
given the potential for small sample sizes and temporal variation
in measures [37]. All statistical analyses were undertaken with
SAS 9.3 and Matlab R2011b 7.13.Binary outcome measures (2–4,6) were analysed using the Co
chran–Mantel–Haenszel (CMH) test at a 95% confidence level
[38,39]. Differences in continuous outcome measures (1,5)
between downtime and control groups were compared using the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K–S) test at a significance level of p = 0.05
[38]. We calculated effect size and relative change measures. Effect
size quantifies the difference between two groups, and is typically
the standardized mean difference (d). Given our small samples, we
adopted Hedges’s g (adjusted) [40] which removes a small positive
bias when calculating d. An effect size of 0.3 is ‘‘small”, 0.5 is ‘‘med-
ium” and 0.8 is ‘‘large” [41]. Relative change describes the size of
absolute change in comparison to a reference (Eq. (1)) [42]. For
example, a relative change of 4 for CRT in the downtime group
indicates that it was five times that of the control group.
Relative change ðCRTdowntime;CRTcontrolÞ
¼ ðCRTdowntime  CRTcontrolÞ
CRTcontrol
ð1Þ
To examine the overall impact of downtime, individual effect
sizes were pooled using a weighted mean estimate. This is a
well-accepted meta-analysis method where estimates from small
samples are given less weight than those from large samples (Eq.
(2)) [43,44].
ESmean ¼
Pn
i¼1
ESi  Ni
Pn
i¼1
Ni
ð2Þ
Here n is the number of subgroups, ESi represents the effect size
for ith subgroup with sample size Ni. The weighted mean estimate
was also applied to calculate the overall relative changes of down-
time by using individual relative changes and sample sizes from
each downtime-control set.3. Results
3.1. Delays and errors in clinician follow-up of test results
Firstly we examined the four indicator tests. As shown in Table 2
sample sizes were sufficient to detect differences in CRT between
downtime and control groups for four of the five events examined
(Appendix C). Of these, two events were associated with a signifi-
cant delay in CRT. In one event, when clinicians could not log on to
the results reporting system for 17 min, the CRT for potassium and
haemoglobin was five and six times that of the respective control
groups with a large effect size. In contrast, a 104-min power outage
in the early hours of the day had a smaller impact, with CRT now
twice that of the control group. A pooled analysis across the four
Table 2
Impact of downtime on delays in clinician follow-up of test results and laboratory processing of test orders.
Downtime events:start time,
duration, IT problem type
Test type Test panel Clinician read time (CRT) Laboratory turnaround time (LTAT)
Mean (days) Significance Test (p value)** RCa ESb Mean (min) Significance
Test (p value)
RCa ESb
(95% confidence
interval)
(95% confidence interval)
Downtime Control Downtime Control
03:00, 300 min, network routing Potassium UEC 5.6 2.7 0.0400–0 .3000 1.1 0.4
(3.5–7.8) (1.7–3.6)
Haemoglobin FBC 5.2 2.9 0.1000–0.6000 0.8 0.3
(3.1–7.3) (1.9–4.0)
14:18, 17 min, network service Potassium* UEC 10.3 2.0 0.0100–0.0400 4.1 0.8
(6.1–14.4) (1.3–2.8)
Haemoglobin* FBC 13.4 2.1 0.0001–0.0030 5.2 0.9
(8.7–18.0) (1.3–3.0)
Troponin Troponin 2068 169 0.30–0.70 11.2 2.4
(3460–7595) (56–282)
APTT Coagulation 17.7 4.4 0.0700–0.6000 3.0 0.7
(7.0–28.4) (1.0–7.9)
06:16, 104 min, power outage Potassium* UEC 1.9 1.0 0.0100–0.0400 0.8 0.2
(1.0–2.7) (0.6–1.4)
Haemoglobin* FBC 2.4 0.9 0.0010–0.0500 1.7 0.4
(1.3–3.4) (0.5–1.2)
10:10, 5 min, network routing APTT Coagulation 3.5 0.5 0.1600–0.9000 5.9 0.4
(1.4–8.5) (0.1–0.9)
03:30, 270 min, network routing Troponin Troponin 1063 259 0.08–0.81 3.1 0.5
(174–2300) (7–524)
5 events Weighted mean estimates 6.41 1.98 2.32 0.48 1251 242.13 4.62 0.86
RCa: relative change.
ESb: effect size.
* Tests with significant differences of CRT between downtime and control groups.
** Range of p values were obtained due to use of repeated cross validation method.
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control group with a medium effect size of 0.48.
The impact on 75 most frequent tests was also examined
(Appendix D). The CRT for liver function tests (LFT), upper respira-
tory infection (URI), histology, electrophoresis (EPG) and infection
control was significantly greater than the matched control group
(p < 0.05). A pooled analysis of all downtimes showed that CRT
was three times greater in the downtime group but with a small
effect size (0.34).
Errors in clinician follow-up of the indicator tests (i.e. missed
reads, futile searches, and duplicate orders) could only be exam-
ined for one event in which sufficient tests were affected. Only
eight troponin tests were affected by a 104-min power outage in
the early hours and the difference in the proportion of futile
searches was not statistically significant (downtime = 0.2 vs. con-
trol = 0.85, p = 0.99). For the 75 most frequent tests, the sample size
was sufficient in only three instances to examine futile searches.
Creatine kinase and uric acid were unaffected by a 17-min applica-
tion failure. And troponin was not affected by a 104-min power
outage.3.2. Delays and errors in laboratory processing of test orders
In two events, sample sizes were sufficient to examine down-
time effects on laboratory processing of troponin tests. However,
differences in LTAT were not significant (Table 2). Delays in pro-
cessing 75 of the most frequent tests were also examined. A signif-
icant difference in the LTAT was observed for five test types across
three downtime events with varying effect sizes (0.4–0.9 Appendix
D). Network routing issues in the early hours delayed the data
entry of the source of respiratory pathogens with a large effect size
(0.9). In contrast a medium effect was observed for C-reactive pro-
tein (CRP, 0.5), and the effect on EPG and full blood count (FBC) was
0.4. No missing test results were observed for all the tests that we
examined.4. Discussion
4.1. Main findings and implications
This study has demonstrated the feasibility of using routinely
collected EMR data to quantify the effects of downtime on clinical
processes. A matched case control design was employed to account
for temporal variations in clinician work patterns and pathology
testing processes which vary by time of the day, day of the week
and month of the year, as well as patient load, clinical staffing
and any ongoing changes to the hospital IT system. To confirm that
any differences between downtime and control groups were not a
result of natural variations unrelated to downtime, we repeated
the case match using control periods as index events.
The methodology therefore has potential to be applied to
pathology and other clinical processes in any hospital where tasks
are pre-defined and time stamped clinical data is captured by the
EMR in a structured manner. For example, in medication manage-
ment each record contains time stamped information about the
medication prescribed and its administration, i.e. when the medi-
cation was ordered, when the order was checked by pharmacy
and when the medication was administered to the patient
[26,45]. Such studies ought to examine all the proposed measures
so that processes that are particularly sensitive to downtimes can
be identified.
We found that the effects of downtime on clinician follow-up
varied according to the type of IT problem. Lack of access to results
reporting delayed clinician review of common pathology tests
including potassium and haemoglobin. Compared to controlperiods, the time taken to review tests was up to six times longer
with an effect size of 0.9 (Table 2). In contrast network routing
problems did not have a significant effect on clinician follow-up.
It is possible that network routing problems were better contained
through redundant routing than application failures (network ser-
vice) and power outages which directly prevented access to test
results. A possible next step is to expand the study to multiple hos-
pitals to examine the effects of downtime by the type of IT problem
(e.g. power outage, network routing, network service, hardware).
The effects on clinician follow-up could be examined for three
indicator tests (Table 2). Of these, two showed a significant differ-
ence in CRT between downtime and control groups. Within each
test, the probability of the downtime effect being a false positive
(independently of any other test) is less than 5%. The probability
that the downtime effect is a false positive in at least one of the
three tests is p = 1  (1  p)3 = 14.3% [46].
Effects of downtime were not uniformly measurable in our
study. While the size of our sample was adequate to measure
delays in clinician follow-up in four events and laboratory process-
ing of test orders in two events, the study was not adequately pow-
ered to examine smaller differences in the proportions of errors.
Another possible next step is to evaluate the methodology for mea-
suring the effects of errors in clinical processes. The duration of
downtime is also another area for further investigation. While
longer downtimes may provide larger samples, one possible way
to examine the effects of brief downtimes with similar temporal
characteristics is to pool tests by the type of IT problem, e.g. all
downtimes due to a power outage.
4.2. Comparison with the literature
No previous studies have sought to measure errors and delays
in clinical processes due to downtime. Our results are consistent
with those of previous qualitative studies which found that down-
time caused delays in clinical tasks using interviews, surveys,
observations and analyses of incident reports [12,14,15]. Com-
pared to those studies a major advantage of our approach is that
it seeks to quantify the effects of downtime by measuring the
real-time effects on clinical processes using EMR data. Characteri-
sation of real-time effects will enable proactively monitoring of IT
systems to facilitate early detection of incidents before they impact
care delivery and patient safety [22].
4.3. Limitations
The study was conducted at one teaching hospital attached to
the university with specific IT systems and network infrastructure
(i.e. the EMR that was integrated with a laboratory information
system with specific IT network and power system configurations).
The effects on clinician follow-up may therefore not be generaliz-
able to other hospitals with a different IT systems configuration
and workflow. We focused on measuring the effects of unplanned
system downtime, and no planned events were examined. The
time of initial order entry was not available, and we did not have
access to network latency, response time and timeout data which
might provide a more robust characterisation of the nature and
effects of downtime. Nevertheless, we have demonstrated the fea-
sibility of a method that can be applied to other clinical processes
and in other settings.5. Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that a matched case-control
design is feasible to measure the effects of downtime on delays
and errors in clinical processes. The methodology has potential to
314 Y. Wang et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 59 (2016) 308–315be applied to examine the effects of downtime in other clinical pro-
cesses where tasks are pre-defined and time stamped clinical data
is routinely captured by the EMR. Clinician follow-up of test results
was significantly delayed by downtime. The impact of such delays
on patient outcomes is an area for future investigation. Any impact
of downtime on missed reads, futile searches, duplicate orders and
missing test results was not detected because the sample of
affected tests was insufficient to examine differences. Further
experiments that are adequately powered to detect small differ-
ences are needed to rule out any effect downtime might have on
errors in clinician follow-up and laboratory processing of test
orders.
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